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Abstract: To say that the level of fatalities resulting from an earthquake is inversely related to a 
country’s per capita level of income is hardly novel.  What makes our approach novel is that we 
relate fatalities to both per capita income and the level of inequality that exists within a country 
through their joint impact on the likelihood of collective action being taken to mitigate the 
destructive potential of quakes.  We first develop a theoretical model which offers an explanation 
as to why, in some environments, different segments of society prove incapable of arriving at 
what all parties perceive to be an agreeable distribution of the burden of the necessary collective 
action, causing the relatively wealthy simply to self-insure against the disaster while leaving the 
relatively poor to its mercy.  Following this, we test our theoretical model by evaluating 269 large 
earthquakes occurring worldwide, between 1960 and 2002, taking into account other factors that 
influence a quake’s destructiveness such as its magnitude, depth and proximity to population 
centers.  Using a Negative Binomial estimation strategy with both random and fixed estimators, 
we find strong evidence of the theoretical model’s predictions.  That is, while earthquakes 
themselves are natural phenomena beyond the reach of humankind, our collective inaction with 
respect to items like the creation and enforcement of building codes, failure to retrofit structures 
and to enact quake-sensitive zoning clearly plays a part in determining the actual toll that a given 
quake takes.  And, it is through these and other examples of collective inaction that limited per 
capita income and inequality couple together with a given quake’s natural destructive power in 
determining the actual fatalities resulting from a quake. 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, a country’s level of inequality has been viewed as an outcome of its 
general economic performance, rather than an input into that performance.  This began to change 
in the 1990’s with the publication of a number of papers that addressed the impact that inequality 
itself might have on a country’s economic performance, especially on its growth rate.  Galor and 
Zeira (1993), Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and 
Benabou (1996) have been among the frontrunners of this literature.  The initial impulses in this 
strand of research concerned the political economy implications of inequality (especially tax 
selection by the median voter) and capital market imperfections (which limit the investment 
options for the relatively poor) as the main channels through which inequality might impact the 
overall efficiency and growth of an economy. 
Another strand of related research extends these outcomes by suggesting that inequality 
can be linked to economic performance in other ways.  Examples include the role that inequality 
can play in political instability, as evidenced by greater social conflict, which can lead to reduced 
investment levels (Alesina and Perotti (1996)) and limit a country’s ability to effectively respond 
to external shocks (Rodrik (1999)).  Further, such social conflict inevitably leads to increased 
violence and crime, which also can reduce the overall economic performance of a country 
through its direct costs in lives and property damaged and through its indirect costs in terms of 
medical resources required to treat those injured, lost productivity from those injured or killed 
and the resources needed for policing that must be diverted from other, arguably more productive, 
activities to mitigate, if not prevent, these criminal activities (see Fajnzylber et al (2002) and 
Bourguignon (2001)). 
Social unrest and the resulting criminal activities, however, are not the only factors 
leading to unnecessary loss of lives and property damage.  Each year, throughout the world, 
natural disasters claim tens of thousands of lives, injure several times more, and cause billions of  
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dollars in property damage.  Earthquakes alone claim thousands of lives a year (in some cases, 
more than a hundred thousand lives in a single quake).  Some natural disasters can be foreseen (or 
predicted with some probability) and thus measures can be taken to limit their severity.  In many 
instances, these measures require collective action by society.
1  For instance, in the case of 
earthquakes, the potentially devastating effects of the quakes can be limited through communal 
preparedness and mitigation activities such as the creation and enforcement of rigorous building 
codes, retrofitting of bridges, highways and other structures, zoning regulations (i.e., land-use 
controls which limit construction near fault lines), proper licensing requirements for contractors, 
engineers and architects as well as proper training of search-and-rescue professionals. 
The ability of a country to pursue such collective action is, however, limited by its 
income and the ability of the population to arrive at an agreeable distribution of the economic 
burden of the actions.
2  Given this, we analyze the impact of a country’s per capita income and 
level of inequality on earthquake fatalities.  To be sure, others have considered the link between 
per capita income and quake deaths (see, for example, Dunbar, Bilham, and Laituri (2003)).  But 
the theoretical and empirical links between inequality and quake fatalities have, to date, not been 
considered.  As such, we first develop a theoretical model which shows both how per capita 
income and inequality are related to the actual death toll resulting from a given earthquake.   
Further, the theoretical model offers an explanation as to why, in some environments, different 
segments of society prove incapable of arriving at an agreeable distribution of the burden of the 
necessary collective action, causing the wealthy simply to self-insure against the disaster while 
leaving the relatively poor to its mercy.  Our theoretical model indicates that collective action is 
an increasing function of per capita income and a decreasing function of a country’s degree of 
                                                 
1  Worldwide collective action in earthquakes in the form of pooling data started as early as 1899 (Howell, Jr. (1990, p. 
29).  Furthermore, international relief aid following catastrophic earthquakes has intensified in the last few decades. 
2 Alesina and Drazen (1991) consider a framework in which stabilization entails tax increases to eliminate a budget 
deficit; in that case, socioeconomic groups may shift the burden of stabilization onto each other (see the references 
therein for other works that report similar results).  
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inequality.  To test these predictions, we analyze empirically 269 6+ Richter-scale quakes 
occurring worldwide between 1960 and 2002.  The results of this analysis strongly support the 
theoretical predictions.  That is, while potentially devastating quakes are acts of nature, the actual 
death toll arising from them is very much the result of the interaction of political-economic 
institutions and nature. 
The next section considers examples of some recent, potentially catastrophic earthquakes.  
Some of these quakes proved to be worst-case scenarios, while others led to relatively few 
fatalities.  This anecdotal evidence clearly shows that mitigation activities, such as high-level 
building codes, are absolutely essential in alleviating the effects of severe quakes.  Equally 
important, however, is enforcement of these codes, or other mitigation activities, which all too 
often is lacking, especially in developing countries.  The reason for the absence of or failing to 
enforce high-level building codes and aggressively retrofitting structures is obvious:  These 
activities can be extremely expensive and building a consensus to finance such activities often 
proves problematic.  Too often, when necessary collective action fails to occur, the cause is either 
that society’s per capita income is simply too low to generate the necessary resources or due to 
conflict between different segments of society who cannot agree on the distribution of the relative 
burden of the high costs of effective regulation. 
As mentioned above, Section 2 considers examples of some recent earthquakes.  Section 
3 provides rationale for collective action.  Section 4 presents the theoretical model and results.  
Section 5 discusses data and contains univariate empirical results.  Section 6 presents multivariate 
empirical results.  Section 7, which contains ‘further empirical considerations’, pertains most 
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2. Differential Effects of Potentially Catastrophic Earthquakes 
The difference in the outcomes of earthquakes in countries with varying degrees of 
collective action can be quite astonishing.  Noji (1997, p. 139) provides such a comparison 
between the 1988 earthquake in Armenia and the 1989 earthquake in Loma Prieta, California 
(which is commonly known as the San Francisco earthquake) by pointing out that the former had 
half the energy release of the latter and yet caused 25,000 deaths while the Loma Prieta quake 
resulted in less than 100 deaths.  Noji rightfully concludes that “[t]he differences in impacts 
between these two earthquakes is directly related to differences in the degree of disaster-
mitigation and disaster-preparedness measures taken in those areas.  Strict adherence to building 
codes (as well as zoning ordinances during the past few decades) in the latter region undoubtedly 
saved many lives and kept thousands of buildings from collapsing.” 
Perhaps more enlightening are actual post-quake reconnaissance reports from the 
Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER) which analyze severe 
quakes and regularly point to the positive effects of collective action and, unfortunately, the dire 
consequents of their lack.  For example, the MCEER report which followed the devastating, 6.8 
Richter-scale quake, that occurred in Algeria, May 27, 2003, claiming 2,700 lives, concludes that 
the death toll from the quake was greatly exacerbated by the lack of high-level construction 
regulations for privately-built housing (though such regulations exist for government-built 
housing), the absence of licensing for contractors, engineers and architects and the heavy demand 
for housing arising from a rapidly growing population which enticed many unqualified 
individuals into construction trades.  While this case is extreme in that building codes, to the 
extent that they existed, did not apply to privately constructed housing and since there was a lack 
of proper licensing of contractors, the mere existence of these types of collective action, in and of 
itself, is not sufficient.  There must, of course, be rigorous enforcement.  This is apparent in the 
6.4 Richter-scale earthquake occurring in Changureh, Iran on June 22, 2002, which claimed 261  
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lives.  The MCEER report on that quake notes that while Iran has building codes which are 
comparable to those existing in the United States, they tend to be enforced only in the country’s 
larger cities.  In smaller villages where most of the deaths from the quake occurred, effectively no 
seismic-related building codes exist which, when coupled with relatively low levels of income in 
those areas, had lead many to build their homes with poor design/construction and with low-
quality materials. 
The MCEER’s report on the 7.4 Richter-scale earthquake in Marmara, Turkey on August 
17, 1999, which claimed about 17,000 lives is also informative.  The report’s most important 
conclusion for the present study is “the dismal performance of the reinforced concrete frames, 
virtually ubiquitous in the region. The collapse of thousands of these buildings transformed this 
earthquake from a damaging event to a catastrophe.”  This is despite the fact that “[d]esign and 
construction of reinforced concrete frames to withstand strong earthquake motions ... are well 
understood by Turkish engineers.”
3  Cost-saving concerns in the relatively poorer regions of 
Turkey lead to a fateful under use of relatively expensive building materials:  “Steel, being by far 
the most expensive construction material in Turkey, has been used rather sporadically in 
construction.”  Furthermore, zoning codes were, at best, unevenly enforced as many people built 
their homes—and firms (even some state-owned enterprises) built their plants—on land made 
relatively cheap by its proximity to dangerous fault lines although the code strictly rules out any 
kind of development around fault lines.  Clearly, the society did not or was not able to regulate 
                                                 
3 Not surprisingly, in the history of earthquake fatalities, by far the greatest proportion of victims have died because of 
the collapse of adobe, rubble-stone, and rammed earth (i.e., the unreinforced masonry (URM)) buildings and other 
types of masonry buildings (such as unreinforced fired-brick masonry and concrete block masonry buildings).   
Reinforced concrete-frame houses, on the other hand, are generally less likely to collapse.  When they do collapse, 
however, they are substantially more lethal and kill a higher percentage of their occupants than do masonry buildings.  
Reinforced concrete requires much more sophisticated and elaborate construction techniques than URM.  Despite that, 
reinforced concrete is often used in communities around the world where either technical competence is inadequate or 
inspection and enforcement are lacking (the earthquakes in Armenia (1988) and Turkey (1999) provide examples of 
these various points).  Furthermore, whereas the debris of building of adobe, rubble masonry, and brick can be removed 
with primitive tools, reinforced concrete entails severe problems for rescuers especially where specialized heavy 
equipment cannot be used for one reason or another.  
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the rapid urbanization in that region.
4  The conclusion of this reconnaissance report highlights the 
importance of collective action: “Unfortunately, the rapid development of the region overtaxed 
the ability of the society to assure that these principles were followed.  The result was inadequate 
buildings, when there need not have been, and a tragic catastrophe.  The ultimate lesson therefore 
is that building and development is simply not a physical process—governmental institutions and 
social processes must develop in parallel, to keep up with the physical demands and assure 
minimum acceptable standards of construction and public safety.” 
These few examples clearly show that the potentially devastating effects of major 
earthquakes are, if not preventable, at least subject to significant mitigation by collective action.  
In the following sections, we first offer a discussion of the potential for collective versus private 
action and then develop a theoretical model of the interrelations between a country’s per capita 
income and level of inequality, the likelihood of collective action and the fatalities resulting from 
a given earthquake. 
 
3. Collective vs. Private Action  
As the anecdotal evidence shows, there seems to be significant rationale for collective 
action directed at mitigating the effects of significant earthquakes.  At their base, collective 
earthquake preparedness and mitigation activities aim to protect people from the consequences of 
their own ignorance.
5  Few potential homeowners (or renters) are technically capable of 
                                                 
4 Perhaps the most vulnerable areas are the informal housing sectors on the periphery of many rapidly growing cities in 
developing countries, which are built on soft grounds.  Lomnitz (1999) states that in the 1985 Mexico City earthquake 
“buildings collapsed on soft ground and nowhere else” (p. 9) and that this soft ground has “a density of 1.1, which is 
only 10 percent higher than water” (p. 11). 
 
5 Lagorio (1990, p. 249) describes people’s ignorance of the potential consequences of earthquakes and their failure to 
personalize the consequences of an actual event when the probability of its occurrence is not an immediate threat: 
“Lack of earthquake hazards mitigation programs and preparedness plans are commonly due to a community’s failure 
to grasp the potential impacts of seismic activity in the area.  By misunderstanding the probable recurrence intervals of 
earthquakes, say one that is said to have a 100-year return period or that is beyond the life expectancy of the average 
person, there is a tendency to rationalize that ‘one will not occur during my life time’.  Such rationalization ignores the 
possibility that two 100-year-recurrence earthquakes may occur within the same year or two.”  As a matter of fact, as  
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evaluating fully the potential hazards inherent in a commodity as complex as a family dwelling.  
In the housing market, major information asymmetry exists between the sellers and buyers.  The 
consequences of such adverse selection problems have been well studied since Akerlof (1970).  
Often the end result is another version of Gresham’s law, which in our context can be 
summarized as “bad buildings will drive out the good” if there is no regulation or no effective 
enforcement of the existing regulation. 
As an alternative, one may consider the presence of a market for the information 
provided by ‘structural experts’ who inspect properties and provide an impartial assessment about 
them to potential buyers.  The performance of such a market, however, will be inefficient from 
society’s point of view since most houses will be considered by a number of potential buyers 
leading to needlessly redundant inspections.  Alternatively, the seller may provide an inspection 
report.  But then, even though duplication of effort is avoided, the potential collusion between the 
seller and structural expert may reduce the value of the inspection report’s information content. 
Of course, a well-functioning insurance market that offers buyers protection from 
earthquake hazards could eliminate the rationale for collective action.  Many studies, however, 
report that such an insurance purchase typically depends on the subjective risk perceived by the 
homeowners.  Should all potential buyers or owners perceive the same level of risk, such a 
market could effectively function.  This is highly unlikely, however, when the issue at hand is 
something with relatively low frequency, like a major earthquake.  In this situation, buyers and 
owners are likely to have widely divergent beliefs as to the likelihood of a devastating quake, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Noji (1997, p. 138) reports “[a] series of three great earthquakes (estimated magnitudes 8.6, 8.4, and 8.7) ... occurred 
during a 3-month period in the winter of 1811-1812 near the town of New Madrid, Missouri.” 
Lagorio (1990, p. 249) also comments on the ‘Act of God’ syndrome which suggests that “nothing can be 
done to stop it, so why bother?  This echoes the feeling that a disastrous event that is about to happen is so big that 
nothing can be done to help - we are all doomed and in the hands of God anyway, so let nature take its course.  On local 
government’s part, there is always the excuse that there aren’t enough resources or funds available for earthquake 
hazards mitigation.  Consequently, there are always more important things to worry about.  And finally, when there is 
lack of data or inadequate information on the subject, confusion results and preparedness efforts lag.  Of course, after a 
damaging earthquake, all of those excuses are forgotten, and at that point the community has a tendency to ask, Why 
wasn’t something done 10 years ago to prevent this?” 
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especially over a relatively brief period of time (Kunreuther et al (1978), Hogarth and Kunreuther 
(1985), Palm (1995)), leading to Lagorio’s (1990, p. 164) observation that, “when there is lack of 
data or inadequate information on the subject, confusion results and preparedness efforts lag”. 
A final rationale for regulation may be found in its external benefits.  A home that is 
earthquake-unsafe imposes some costs on adjacent properties as well.  In many circumstances, 
structurally unsound buildings collapse on other buildings that otherwise could have escaped the 
earthquake undamaged.
6 
At one end of the spectrum, are countries such as the U.S. in which very stringent 
building and zoning codes are enforced effectively and even very costly retrofitting of pre-code 
buildings is achieved to some extent within the confines of collective action.
7  Further, in the 
U.S., an earthquake insurance market exists, though it is relatively weak since regulation arising 
from collective action has proven very effective in minimizing the fatality, injury and damage 
risks.  At the other end of the spectrum, are countries such as Algeria in which no regulation 
exists (and therefore no measures against earthquakes can be enforced) and, making matters 
                                                 
6 As Lagorio (1990, p. 164) elaborates on this issue “considerations for a single isolated building are very different 
from those involved for a building in a neighborhood setting of an entire block, where multiple buildings sit side by 
side. ... As seen in the 1985 Mexico earthquake and the October 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, corner buildings are 
particularly vulnerable to damage, as they have nothing to lean on at the open street side. ... Unfortunately, there is no 
simple solution, and the matter is still being debated by design professionals.  Some have asked the questions: “What 
value is it to upgrade an individual URM [i.e., unreinforced masonry] building when in fact all the buildings on the 
block not retrofitted might act in concert and impact the strengthened building negatively?” 
7 In the U.S., historically, the traditional approach to improving the performance of structures and upgrading building 
code provisions has focused on the advancement of design standards for new buildings.  However, since the 
construction of new buildings only accounts for an addition of about 2 percent per year to the existing total building 
stock, retrofitting of buildings that were designed under the previous less restrictive code standards became a critical 
issue about a quarter century ago.  Quoting Lagorio (1990): “It was not until 1978 ... that the problem associated with 
upgrading the seismic performance of older, existing structures was identified as a critical one to be addressed seriously 
by design professionals, researchers, and public policy officials” (p. 139).  According to the 1986 tax legislation, the 
investment tax credit offers a one-time 13-20 percent write-off on income taxes in exchange for a written agreement to 
keep the exterior facades of older, existing buildings in their original forms (see pp. 152-153 of Lagorio (1990)). In 
addition, “recent California state legislation ... requires local governments at municipal and county levels to identify, 
quantify, and assess older, existing hazardous buildings located within their jurisdictions.  Further, they are encouraged 
to submit appropriate programs and plans for earthquake mitigation efforts dealing with the buildings so identified” (p. 
155).  There are also triggered ordinances in cities and counties that are seismically very active.  “When a building 
owner wishes to do substantial remodeling or renovation that exceeds a certain percentage level of cost and/or floor 
space additions, the rehabilitation work must include seismic upgrading in order for a building permit to be obtained.  
[A] triggered ordinance only applies to buildings undergoing renovation, whereas the retroactive ordinance applies to 
all hazardous buildings across the board” (p. 157). 
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worse, such countries typically also lack a functioning earthquake insurance market. 
Somewhere between the US and Algerian examples, are countries such as Turkey.   
Following the 1999 earthquake in Turkey that killed 17,000 people, its parliament decided that 
measures such as enforcing the existing building code effectively and retrofitting the structurally 
unsound private buildings were well beyond the means of the taxpayers of the country.  Even 
though many earthquake experts insisted that installing some of the above-mentioned measures 
were crucial, the parliament mandated only a modest earthquake insurance program, which, 
despite the government’s mandate, has commanded a very weak following.
8 
While it is true that the dynamics of a specific quake, such as its magnitude, its depth, and 
proximity to population centers are the primary determinants of a quake’s level of devastation, 
collective action of the sort that we have been discussing can effectively limit this devastation.  
As such, consider the following theoretical model of these interrelations. 
 
4. Theoretical Model 
There are two types of households: L-types (low-income households) and H-types (high-
income households).  We assume the measure of all households is one.  Within society, the 
fraction of low-income type households is L and thus the fraction of high-income households is H 
= 1-L.
9  Income of an L-type household is denoted by yL > 0, and that of an H-type by yH > 0 
such that yH = k yL, where k ≥ 1.  That is, k denotes the extent of income inequality in society 
(observe that k = 1 implies that society has no income inequality). 
                                                 
8 However, the current government decided on partial retrofitting of public buildings and bridges.  This happened since 
the present government intends to start entry negotiations with the European Union within a year, and in order to 
qualify to start those negotiations, the country’s regulations in various areas - including a minimum earthquake 
preparedness of public buildings and bridges - have to comply with the European Union’s regulation in them. 
 
9 We allow all possible cases L > H, L < H and L = H.  But to prevent cases, where despite, say, there are more low-
income households than the high-income households (i.e., despite L > H), the high- income individuals constitute the 
majority by having larger household sizes, we assume that each household in the society has the same size; that will 
ensure that when, say, L > H, the low- income individuals will definitely constitute the majority.  
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A major earthquake occurs with probability p ∈ (0,1) and, thus, does not occur with 
probability 1-p.  Society decides whether to take collective or private action against the quakes 
based on majority voting.  Importantly, we assume that those with relatively more at stake in the 
outcome of a particular vote also have a greater probability of voting than those with less at stake 
(this will be expanded upon below).  If society, based on a majority vote, decides to take 
collective action against earthquakes, a tax will be imposed to fund communal earthquake 
preparedness and mitigation activities that benefit both types of households uniformly.  If, on the 
contrary, private action is opted for, individual households take their own precautions against 
earthquakes. 
 
A) Collective Action 
In the case of collective action, for simplicity, we assume a proportional tax rate, t.   
Observe that (L + (1-L)k)yL is the per capita income of society, denoted by y.  Let Cc be the per 
capita amount of public funds that are necessary to ensure each household’s full preparedness, 
given collective action.  To simplify our notation, we use the normalization Cc = 1.  We also 
assume y ≥ Cc.
10  Let t ∈ (0,1/y).
11  With collective action, per capita tax revenue will be ty.  Let q 
denote the probability of surviving a given earthquake.  With the normalization Cc = 1, per capita 
tax revenue, ty, as a fraction of Cc can then represent, q, the probability of surviving for a 
household, given an earthquake.  Then we have q = ty = t(L+(1-L)k)yL ≤ 1.
12 
With collective action, the expected utility function of a type i household is  
                                                 
10 Per capita income in society, y, is assumed to cover at least Cc =1; thus, perfect coverage via public action against 
earthquakes is within reach of society, even though this may require society to spend its entire income (which becomes 
the case at the lower bound of y.  This, however, will never be an equilibrium as Proposition 1 below will imply). 
11 Observe that the assumption y ≥ Cc = 1 also ensures that the maximum possible tax rate t = 1/y never exceeds 1. 
12 Clearly, with the maximum possible tax rate t = 1/y, we have ty = 1 which will not have to exceed Cc =1; i.e., even 
with the maximum possible tax rate t = 1/y, society will not end up collecting more in taxes than needed to provide 
complete coverage.  
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ui
c = p (1-t)yi (ty) + (1-p)(1-t)yi. 
Thus, if the tax rate resulting from a majority vote is t, a type i household is able to spend 
(1-t)yi on goods and services when either a major earthquake does not occur or when communal 
earthquake preparedness and mitigation activities have been undertaken perfectly.  The latter 
holds if q = t*y = 1, which amounts to perfect coverage against a major earthquake.  If the tax 
revenue t*y and thus the probability of surviving a major earthquake (when such an earthquake 
occurs) is less than one, then (1 - t*y) fraction of households will lose their lives (and thus will 
earn no income and be unable to consume any goods and services).
13 
For collective action to be more beneficial on average than private action for individuals, 
the cost of private earthquake preparedness and mitigation, C > 0, should be greater than 1, 
otherwise, collective action would not be advantageous for at least one segment of society (this 
will be made more precise below).  With private action, the expected utility function of a type i 
household is  
ui
p = p yi + (1-p) yi - C = yi - C. 
Suppose i types win the majority vote.  For i types in order to decide whether or not to 
support collective action, they have to first assess whether or not their expected utility with 
collective action, ui
c = p (1-t)yi (ty) + (1-p)(1-t)yi, would be greater than it would be with private 
action, ui
p = yi - C.  Making this assessment requires knowledge of the tax rate needed to 
implement collective action. For i types to make the most out of the collective action, the 
necessary tax rate, ti, should maximize their expected utility when collective action is chosen, ui
c 
= p (1-ti)yi (tiy) + (1-p)(1-ti)yi. 
 
   Proposition 1: With the tax rate, ti, that maximizes i types’ expected utility in collective 
                                                 
13 We do not model grief for the deceased family members since, even without grief, our results hold, while with grief 
our results are strengthened, albeit at the expense of needless additional notation. 
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action, q increases in y as long as y < 1+1/p, and q becomes 1 when y = 1+1/p.  Thus, given any 
level of p, the probability of surviving a major quake increases in y. 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
ui
c =  yi [p (1-ti) ty  + (1-p)(1-ti)]. 
∂uL
c/∂t = yi [py - 2ptiy - (1-p)] = 0. 
Thus, ti = ½ - (1-p)/2py.          ( 1 )  
Then q becomes ti y.  That is, q = (½)y - (1-p)/2p ≤  1.         (2) 
Trivially, ∂q/∂y = ½ > 0.  Simple algebra yields that q = 1 when y* = 1+ 1/p.      (3) 
Thus, q increases in y up to y* and q = 1 when y* = 1+ 1/p.  This completes the proof of 
Proposition 1. 
 
First, note from the above proof that the same ti will be levied on both types of 
households if they opt for collective over private action.  Also note that ti decreases in y.  Observe 
that the condition of ti entails y = 1 + 1/p when q = 1 (i.e., when there is perfect coverage against 
a major earthquake).  Suppose i types prefer collective action.  When p is very low, a very high 
per capita income (e.g., approaching infinity) would induce i types to obtain perfect coverage.  
When p approaches 1, on the other hand, even a very low per capita income (e.g., y = 2Cc) would 
induce them to obtain perfect coverage. 
Note that, if the majority decides on q = t*y = 1, a household obtains the same level of 
utility regardless of whether the earthquake occurs.  That utility level will be ui
c = (1-t*)yi.  But 
since t*y = 1 implies t* = 1/y, we obtain 
ui
c= yi - yi/y.           ( 4 )  
Thus, each ui
c increases in the household’s income, yi, but decreases in the household’s relative 
income, yi/y. 
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B) Private Action 
Will L-types and H-types support collective over private action?  By definition, the cost 
of private earthquake preparedness and mitigation, C, is greater than 1.  For L-types, clearly uL
c = 
yL - yL/y > uL
P= yL - C since C > 1 > yL/y.  Thus, L-types will always vote for collective action. 
On the contrary, H-types may or may not support collective action.  The following result 
indicates that the outcome of this decision for H-types depends on the level of income inequality, 
k, existing in society. 
 
Proposition 2:  Consider any set of parameter values L > 0, C > 1 as well as any y ≥  1 
and any k ≥ 1.  There will be some threshold level of k below which a majority vote will lead to 
collective action since both L- and H-types will support it, while above this level of k, H-types will 
vote for private action. 
Proof of Theorem 2:  Let ∆H = uH
p - uH
C = yH/y - C.   That is, when ∆H > 0, H-types will 
vote for private action; otherwise they will join L-types in supporting collective action.  ∆H can be 
simplified as k/(L+(1-L)k) - C.  Note that, when k = 1, ∆H < 0.  Also note that ∆H increases in k 
strictly monotonically.  Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there will be a specific 
threshold level of k at or below which collective action will be supported by all
14 while above that 




                                                 
14 In this paper, whenever there is a tie (or indifference), for simplicity the tie-break favors collective action. 
15 Our analysis in this section (and in the next section) compares the perfect coverage outcomes of the collective and 
private action cases.  The most interesting case is 1 < C < (t*q=1)yH where t*q=1 is the tax rate in the collective action 
case with q = 1.  Now, consider the imperfect coverage case q < 1 with collective action (which is significantly more 
complicated and lengthy than q = 1).  Observe that our results will still hold with q < 1, since in the private action case, 
the imperfect coverage will cost qC, and thus the counterpart of the above case will entail qC < (t*q<1)yH where t*q<1 is 
the tax rate in the collective action case with q < 1.  
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C) The Majority Vote with Probabilistic Voting 
In the remainder of our theoretical analysis, we will focus on the interesting case in which 
1< C < yH/y.  Here, H-types will always vote against collective action since uH
c = yH - yH/y < uH
p 
= yH - C.  Since L-types always support collective action, in this case collective action will only 
be chosen if L-types win the majority vote.  Should L > ½ and every agent votes, the outcome of 
the majority vote will be collective action.  But as MCEER reports noted earlier indicate, most 
developing countries do not exhibit collective action in earthquake preparedness.  This would 
seem to be inconsistent with what we have just outlined given that, in most (if not all) developing 
countries, L-type households compose the majority of the population.  To allow for the possibility 
that H-types may win the majority vote, or at least control the elected government following a 
vote, despite their composing less than half of a country’s population, we take advantage of a 
majority voting model.  The key to this model is that it assumes that differing segments of a 
population have differing probabilities of voting, based on their subjective evaluations of what is 
at stake for them in the vote.
16 
Our main premise is that segments in a society that have more at stake in an election are 
more likely to vote, or alternatively, they (and consequently the politicians and political parties 
representing them) are likely to secure a larger portion of seats in any government than the 
portion of society that they compose would suggest.
17  As detailed by McMillan and Zoido 
(2004), Peruvian politics of the 1990s provides a prime example of this situation.  During that 
period, the sitting President’s chief of secret police methodically bribed at least 1600 people, 
including politicians, judges and the news media (some TV channels received $2 million monthly 
                                                 
16 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the use a probabilistic voting model.  
17 In some developing countries, suspecting a significant loss in the popular vote in coming elections, incumbent parties 
have changed election laws so as to maintain their majority in the government.  For example, the ruling party in Turkey 
led by the then prime minister, Turgut Ozal, implemented an unparalleled 10% popular vote threshold at the country- 
level for each party to be represented in the parliament.  This new election system led to Ozal’s party receiving 35% of 
the popular vote but controlling 65% of the seats in the parliament following the 1987 parliamentary elections.  
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each) to secure their support.
18  In 2000, the President’s party held 51 of the congress’ 120 seats, 
thus, a majority coalition could be secured by gaining the support of ten opposition party 
members.  Leaving nothing to chance, the President’s chief of secret police successfully bribed 
twelve congressmen to change parties and another five to serve as informants, while remaining in 
the opposition.
19  Given the resulting, comfortable 63/57 split, no single former oppositionist held 
power against the regime.  Doubtless, the most remarkable aspect of the explicit bribery was the 
audacity of the plan and its principle proponent, the country’s chief of secret police, who not only 
had the negotiations video-taped, but took care to ensure that the tapes documented the bribe-
takers actually accepting the money (see McMillan and Zoido (2004, pp. 1-5)). 
In addition, voting, especially in developing countries can be quite cumbersome as, 
among other problems, long lines are common and rolls or eligible voters are not well maintained 
or even purposely corrupted.
20  Further, outright fraud is not uncommon, taking the form of ‘vote 
early, vote often’ campaigns, votes being cast by deceased individuals or situations in which 
opposition party ballots are ‘lost’ or unjustly disqualified. 
Given these types of problems which often surround majority voting, especially in lesser-
developed democracies, we assume that segments of voters with more at stake are the ones most 
likely to successfully vote, that is, those with the most at stake in an election will prove to be the 
portion of the electorate most likely to have their vote both cast and accurately counted.  As such, 
it is this portion of society that will end-up, in many if not most circumstances, holding a share of 
the legislature that is disproportionate to their share of the population. 
                                                 
18 Such retrogressing of democracy is not unique to Peru, for cross-country data showing that it is typically associated 
with low levels of per capita income (see Przeworsky et al., 2000). 
19 “Each of these congressmen signed three documents: a receipt of the bribe; a letter asking Fujimori to admit him or 
her into Fujimori’s party, Peru 2000; and, on congressional letterhead paper, a compromiso de honor (a promise on 
one’s honor, a gentlemen’s agreement)” (McMillan and Zoido, (2004, p. 7)).  Also see Docquier and Tarbalouti (2000) 
on parliamentary vote purchases in developing countries. 
20 Even in developed countries, rolls may leave some eligible voters aside; in the U.S. state of Florida, for instance, as 
of late May 2004 many eligible voters were not yet on the rolls for the presidential elections taking place in November 
2004 (see Fineout, 2004, p.1).  
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In our setup, there are only two possible outcomes from majority voting, collective or 
private action. When yH/y > C > 1, the subsequent utility rankings of the two types are diagonally 




p.  The difference between the higher and 
lower utility levels for a type (namely uH
p - uH
c for H-types and uL
c > uL
p for L-types) is key in 
determining what is at stake for each type. 
Let mi denote the probability that each i type will vote.  To be precise, the likelihood that 






β, where β > 1; in 
other words, each agent’s voting probability will respond to whatever he/she has at stake, at an 
increasing rate.




p, m will reduce to (yH/y - C)
β/(C-yL/y)
β.  So, 
the expected outcome of the majority vote will be E(m,L) = (mH/mL) H/L.  If E(m,L) is greater 
than one, H-types will be the expected winners, while the contrary holds if it is less than or equal 
to one. 
Consider the following example: Let y = 9, and p = 1/8, so that, if L-types win the 
majority vote, they pick q = 1 (by Equation (3) in the proof of Proposition 1).  In addition, let L = 
3/5, and H = 2/5 and β = 3.  Further, assume that C = 11/10 < yH/y.  In case (1), assume that k = 3.  
Then yL = 5 and yH = 15 will hold, which in turn will yield yH/y > C (since yH/y = 5/3 and C = 
1.1).  Then observe that mH/mL = (yH/y - C)
3/(C - yL/y)
3 = (1.66 - 1.1)
3/(1.1 - .55)
3 = 1.06.  That is, 
each type will have almost the same likelihood of voting.  But since L-types have a three to two 
ratio of potential voters, they will be the expected winners of the majority vote; i.e., E(m,L) = 
1.06 (2/3) = .70.  In case (2) assume that k = 6; thus, yL = 3 and yH = 18 will hold, which again 





3 = 1.62.  That is, each H-type will vote with twice the probability of each L-
type.  Thus, although L/H = 3/2, H-types will be the expected winners of the majority vote; i.e., 
E(m,L) = 1.62 (2/3) = 1.08. 
                                                 
21 When β ≤ 1, it is straightforward to show that L-types will always win the majority vote whenever L > ½.  So, to 
consider the interesting possibility of H-types winning the majority vote despite H < ½, we consider the case β > 1.  
        17
The next result simply follows from ∂m/∂k > 0. 
 
Proposition 2:  Consider any set of parameter values L > 0, C > 1 as well as any y ≥ 1 
and any k ≥ 1.  Given this, the likelihood of H-types winning the majority vote will increase in k. 
 
Propositions 1 and 2 lead to the next result which summarizes our theoretical findings in 
terms of k’s effect on collective action. 
 
Theorem 1:  With any set of parameter values L > 0, C > 1 as well as any y ≥ 1 and any 
k ≥ 1, the likelihood of collective action being chosen by majority vote decreases in k. 
 
Finally, we also need to illustrate that L-types will have less than perfect coverage with 
private action.  Recall that with collective action q = 1 is achieved with y = 1 + 1/p.  Suppose 
collective action with q = 1 (i.e., perfect coverage) is the winning outcome.  With private action, 
perfect coverage is more expensive to achieve, since C > 1.  Even when we suppose that C = 1, 
the utility maximization problem of L-types will yield a lower coverage q = gyL, where g ∈ (0,1] 
is the fraction of an L-type household’s income that will be spent to achieve earthquake 
preparedness.  Consider an L-type household’s utility maximization problem: 
uL
p = p(1-g)yL gyL+(1-p)(1-g)yL. 
The level of g that maximizes the above expected utility function turns out to be g = ½ - 
(1-p)/2pyL.  Thus, q = gyL = 1 can be achieved with yL = 1 + 1/p.  But since yL < y, with private 
action, q < 1 will hold for L-types.  (Alternatively, to see this, consider the following: With 
collective action, an L-type household is able to obtain perfect coverage by paying yL/y < 1.  
Suppose that it is not able to afford more than that.  Since with private action it has to pay C > 1, 
perfect coverage will not be feasible.)  
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D) Predictions of the Theoretical Model 
Proposition 1 states that collective action will save more lives as y, that is, per capita 
income, increases.  But whether collective action will take place or not is a different issue.   
Propositions 1 and 2 allude to this.  Theorem 1, which summarizes these results, states that 
collective action will be less likely as inequality increases.  Consequently, L-types, when left 
alone, will be able to afford less for their earthquake preparedness and mitigation.  Thus, 
earthquake fatalities will increase in k, inequality, as well. 
 
5. Data And Univariate Empirical Results 
From the theoretical model and past research on the destruction caused by earthquakes, 
the key variables in determining fatalities are those related to 1) the dynamics and location of the 
quakes, 2) country specific factors such as population, geographic size and income, and 3) 
unspecified regional factors (see, for example, Schulze, Brookshire, Hageman, and Rschirhart 
(1989), and Dunbar, Bilham, and Laituri (2002)).  The unit of observation in the sample is an 
individual earthquake measuring at least 6 on the Richter-scale, occurring anywhere in the world, 
between 1960 and 2002.  The sample selects from all such earthquakes those for which complete 
data is available.  This leaves 269 observations, arising from 26 countries.  These come from all 
parts of the world: 6 are from Africa, 7 from Asia, 5 from Europe, and 8 from the Americas. 
Information on the dynamics and location of the earthquakes (latitude, longitude, depth, 
magnitude, fatalities and geographic location where damage was reported) were obtained from 
the National Geophysical Data Center’s (NGDC) Significant Earthquake Database.  A key factor 
in determining fatalities, of course, is a quake’s magnitude.  We measure this by using the 
common Richter-scale, as noted above.  Another important factor concerns the distance between 
the epicenter and the affected geographic region, which we estimate by first determining the 
coordinates of the affected region and the surface coordinates of the epicenter, along with its  
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depth from the surface.  Then, we calculate the direct distance, known as the focal distance, by 
taking the square root of the sum of the squares of the depth and surface-distance, that is, we 
complete the triangle formed by the surface-distance and depth (this makes extensive use of the 
ESRI ArcView Geographic Information (GIS)).
22 
Country specific factors include obvious items such as the population of the province(s) 
affected, the land area, in square kilometers, of those provinces and the frequency with which a 
country suffers through major quakes.
23  We measure frequency by taking the ratio of the number 
of 6+ quakes that a country endured during the 1900-1959 period, to 60.  The key country 
specific factors arising from the model relate to a country’s income level and degree of inequality.  
Our measure of the level of income is GDP per capita, in constant (1995) U.S. dollars, which was 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).  Inequality is typically 
measured through the use of Gini codes. 
Two Ginis are commonly available, one based on the distribution of income and the other 
on the distribution of land.  While we use both in our empirical analysis, for the reasons discussed 
below, we choose the land-based Gini as our primary measure of inequality.  That is, to account 
for differences in inequality levels, we use a Gini code taken from the decennial FAO World 
Census of Agriculture, which measures a country’s initial distribution of the operational holdings 
of agricultural land.  As with the more common income-based Gini, the land Gini ranges from 0-
100, in percentage terms, with inequality rising with the Gini. 
According to Deininger and Squire (1998), this variable is appealing, relative to the 
income-based Gini, for the several reasons.  First, and for our purposes most importantly, the 
                                                 
22 The latitude and longitude of the affected regions were collected from the Getty Theasurus of Geographic Names 
online (www.getty.edu).  Also, we would like to thank Brian Anyzeski for assisting us in calculating the distance 
between the affected regions and the epicenters. 
 
23 Population and land area come from several sources: (1) The World Gazetteer (www.world-gazetteer.com),  
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land-based Gini has a much lower correlation with GDP per capita than does the income-based 
measure.  This is important in the present application because we will be using both the Gini and 
GDP per capita as independent variables in our regressions.  Consequently, by using the land-
based Gini, we can effectively control for inequality while minimizing any negative effects 
arising from multi-colinearity between the income-based Gini and GDP per capita might cause. 
Second, the possession of land can be a major determinant of an individual’s productivity and 
investment capacity, especially in agrarian economies.  Third, there are serious inconsistencies in 
the way in which income-based Ginis are calculated between countries (such as wage versus total 
income, individual versus household income and the like).  And, finally, data on land distribution 
is available for earlier years than estimates on income distribution, and for countries in which data 
on income inequality are either not reliable or available. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the primary analysis while 
Appendix 1 provides formal definitions and sources for these variables.  The mean value in the 
sample for the number of earthquake Fatalities is 884 with a rather broad range of 0 to 50,000.  
Population and Square Kilometers of the affected province(s) have means of 8,952 (in thousands) 
and 189,048, respectively.  The direct Distance from the epicenter and the affected region has a 
mean value of 133 and ranges from 5.94 to 811.61.  Magnitude has a mean value of 6.81 and it 
ranges from 6.0 to 8.5 (the sample was purposely limited to the rather severe, 6+ quakes).   
Frequency of earthquakes varies widely across countries from 0.01 to 1.15, with a mean of 0.47.  
The mean value in the sample for GDP per capita is $7,672, varying widely from just over $100 
to $44,774.71.  Inequality has a mean value of 62.97 and it ranges from 37 to 87.  Finally, the 
distribution of quakes across the continents can be seen by considering the continental dummy 
variables. 
_______________________Insert Table 1 About Here__________________________________ 
To get a first glimpse at the predictions embodied in the theoretical model, we pool the 
sample and break the data of Table 1 into the two panels of Table 2 which relate Fatalities,  
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Magnitude, GDP per capita and Inequality.  Panel 2a compares countries according to whether or 
not they have a GDP per capita above or below $1,874, the sample’s median value.  Promisingly, 
as the theoretical model predicts, there does seem to be a negative relation between earthquake 
fatalities and income levels.  More specifically, while the relatively poor countries tend to be hit 
by earthquakes of nearly identical mean Magnitudes as do the relatively wealthy, resulting 
Fatalities are, on average, 85% greater in the poorer countries. 
It is important to note, however, that the univariate difference in means test does not suggest 
that these two values are statistically significant.  Three points are important here.  First, the 
difference in means tests were conducted following difference in variance tests, which showed 
that, in the case of Panel 2b, with respect to Fatalities, the underlying variances were unequal.  
Thus, the results reported in Table 2 are standard, equal variance, difference in means outcomes, 
with the exception of Fatalities in Panel 2b, which was conducted assuming different variances.  
Second, while not statistically different, the divergences in Fatalities reported in Table 2 are 
clearly of practical significance.  Third, and of more importance to the multivariate analysis that 
follows, it should be noted that the lack of significance seems to arise from the extremely large 
standard deviations of Fatalities for both sub-groups of the sample. 
_______________________Insert Table 2 About Here__________________________________ 
Panel 2b compares Fatalities when the sample is broken into sub-groups based on the median 
of Inequality.  Once again, there is evidence, even if statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
inequality may well be positively associated with Fatalities from earthquakes.  Specifically, while 
the relatively equal and unequal sub-groups tend to endure earthquakes that are almost precisely 
equal in Magnitude, resulting Fatalities are 167% greater, on average, in the relatively unequal 
countries. 
While not statistically significant, each of these outcomes suggests two things of importance 
relative to the multivariate analysis that follows.  First, there is reason to suspect that both a 
country’s levels of income and inequality play a role in determining the impact that an earthquake  
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has, in terms of Fatalities, as predicted by our theoretical model.  Equally important, however, 
Table 2 indicates that care must be taken in the multivariate analysis to deal with the extreme 
skewness of some of the key variables, especially Fatalities. 
 
6. Multivariate Empirical Results 
The theoretical model predicts that, holding constant reasonable control variables (such 
as magnitude, population, land area, distance from the epicenter, frequency of major quakes, as 
well as other, unexplained regional factors), fatalities from a quake should be an decreasing 
function of both a country’s levels of per capita income and equality.  And these predictions do 
find some support in the univariate analysis offered in the data section.  To more formally test 
these relations, we estimate: 
 
   
it it it it
it it it it it
INEQUALITY GDPPC FREQ
SQKM POP MAG DIST FATAL
ε α α α
α α α α α
+ + +
+ + + + + =
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
     (5)      
 
where FATAL is earthquake fatalities in country i at time t, DIST is the direct distance from the 
epicenter, MAG indicates the magnitude of the earthquake, POP represents the population of 
province(s) in the affected area, SQKM is the land area of province(s) in the affected area, FREQ 
is the frequency of 6+ Richter quakes locally, GDPPC  indicates the GDP per capita of the 
country, and INEQUALITY represents the country’s land-based Gini. 
Estimation of equation (5) involves two obvious complications.  The first is the dataset’s 
panel nature.  While the data do include quakes occurring in 26 countries, over the 42-year time 
period 1960-2002, giving an average of about 10 quakes per country during the period, the 
distribution across countries varies greatly.  At one end are particularly quake-prone countries 
(such as Indonesia, the United States and Peru) which experienced more than 25 quakes of  
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magnitude 6 or greater during the survey period.  At the opposite end of the distribution are 
places such as Ethiopia, Canada and Honduras that appear in the sample only once. Along with 
these differences, it may well be that other region-specific factors play a role in determining an 
earthquake’s destructiveness.  These factors might include geological issues such as soil/sub-
surface composition and density, whether local fault lines tend to lead to quakes that result in 
lateral, rather than the typically more damaging vertical scrubbing of tectonic plates, or, perhaps, 
local building and location customs.  With these issues in mind, and lacking prior knowledge as 
to the specific nature of any existing region-specific effects, equation (5) was estimated with both 
random and fixed effects procedures, at the continent level.  The reported regressions are a mix of 
the two estimators, where the choice was based on the results of Hausman tests. In each case, the 
employed estimator is identified in the results Tables. 
The second complication in estimating equation (5) concerns the nature of the dependent 
variable, Fatalities arising from an earthquake.  Fatalities are, of course, a non-negative count of 
deaths.  The basic model for count data is the Poisson specification.  This specification is best 
suited for counts with low variation since the model explicitly assumes the conditional mean and 
variance of the dependent variable to be equal.  As shown in Table 2, with a standard deviation 
5.5 times greater than its mean, the assumption of equal mean and variance does not appear to fit 
this data.  Over-dispersion of this order can cause a downward bias in the standard errors 
resulting from Poisson estimation, arguing in favor of the Negative Binomial Regression model.  
This model generalizes the Poisson by expressly relaxing the assumption of equal conditional 
mean and variance through the introduction of a parameter that reflects the unobserved 
heterogeneity between observations in the sample.  The regressions reported below use this 
procedure.  That is, the reported results, as discussed above, are based on Negative Binomial 
models that control for random/fixed effects, at the continent level. 
While the Negative Binomial is designed to handle situations in which the dependent 
variable has a rather broad, non-negative distribution, it remains suspect to extreme outliers.    
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Again, a check of Table 2 suggests evidence of just such outliers, with respect to Fatalities.  The 
mean number of fatalities from a 6+ Richter quake, worldwide, between 1960 and 2002, is 884, 
while the standard deviation of that variable is nearly 5,000. 
A closer inspection of the data shows that, in fact, relatively few of the 269 quakes in the 
sample, only 25 to be precise, involve fatalities in excess of the mean.  This suspicion of 
skewness was confirmed, with a formal test resulting in a Chi-Square value that was significant 
beyond the .001 level.  This degree of skewness in the dependent variable leads us to be 
concerned about the potentially misleading effects of outliers and, as such, to provide a sensitivity 
test for the estimation of equation (5), we estimate and include 3 variants of the basic model:  (1) 
the full 269 quake sample with its maximum death toll of 50,000, (2) a 264 unit sub-sample of 
those quakes that yielded no more than 15,000 fatalities, and (3) a 259 unit sub-sample of those 
with no more than 5,000 fatalities.  In the 259-unit case, we have eliminated roughly the 4% of 
the quakes leading to the greatest number of casualties.  More importantly for the issue of 
outliers, this subtraction yields a mean number of fatalities of 164, with a standard deviation of 
556.  Thus, while the full sample has a standard deviation to mean ratio of 5.5, by the time the top 
4% of the sample is eliminated, this ratio falls to 3.3.  By considering the results of the three 
estimations, in tandem, a clearer picture of the relations embodied in equation (5) should be 
attainable. 
Finally, as is customary, all variables in the estimation are entered in natural logs.  These 
estimations are presented in Table 3.  In each case, the likelihood-ratio test showed positively that 
the probability of these estimates arising from a pooled estimator  (that is, a Negative Binomial 
model with constant dispersion) to be virtually zero for the random-effects models, with Chi-
Square values each significant beyond the.01 level. Finally, in each case, the Wald Chi-Square for 
the full-model log-likelihood test is also highly significant, beyond the .001 level, indicating that 
the likelihood of the included independent variables being jointly equal to zero to be virtually nil. 
________________________Insert Table 3 About Here___________________________  
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Consider first the key variables arising from the theoretical model, GDPPC and 
INEQUALITY.  Recall that in that model, collective action designed to mitigate the effects of 
earthquakes was an increasing function of per capita income and a decreasing function of 
inequality.  Each specification confirms this prediction, significantly, for both variables.  That is, 
with a high degree of confidence, and after taking into account the possible effects of outliers and 
continent–specific effects, it is clear that GDPPC is significantly and negatively related to 
earthquake fatalities.  It is equally clear that INEQUALITY, across specifications, is significantly 
and positively related to fatalities. Taken together, these results reflect rather favorably on the 
theoretical model.  Our interpretation, intuitively, is that as per capita income and equality 
increase, the likelihood of collective action serving to mitigate the fatalities from a given quake 
increases.   And,   given the skewness issue we addressed above, it is particularly reassuring to 
note that, the results hold even as the outliers, in either the 264 or 259 unit sub-samples, are 
eliminated from the sample. 
To give these results practical meaning, the marginal impact on fatalities, for a standard 
deviation change in the key independent variables, is calculated.  For example, holding all else 
constant, relative to a mean value of $7,763, an absolute value change of about $11,000 in 
GDPPC, would be expected to lead to a change of about 28% in fatalities from a given 
earthquake, in the opposite direction, of course.  That is, holding all else constant, an earthquake 
of the average magnitude, about 6.8 on the Richter scale, can be expected to cause roughly 46 
fewer fatalities in a country where GDPPC is $18,763 than it would in a country with the sample 
mean GDPPC of $7,763.  Similarly, the marginal effect for INEQUALITY is about 45%.
24  As 
expected, a country’s levels of per capita income and inequality play very important roles in 
determining earthquake fatalities, both from statistical and practical perspectives. 
Several of the control variables are also quite interesting.  Consider first, the dynamic 
                                                 
24 The marginal effects are calculated from the 259-unit sub-sample, where both key variables have high levels of 
significance and the effect of outliers is minimized, though similar values hold across the specifications.  
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nature of the quakes themselves, as measured by the Richter-scale magnitude, MAG, and the 
distance to the epicenter, DIST.  As would be expected, fatalities are very strongly and positively 
related to MAG, while being strongly negatively related to DIST.  Importantly, these results hold, 
regardless of specification.  Similarly, total population of the affected regions, POP, is 
consistently positively and significantly related to fatalities, across specifications.   Of course, this 
should not be surprising as it reflects little more than the fact that the more people who are at risk, 
all else constant, the more will die from an earthquake of a given size.  Less consistent are the 
results for the square kilometers of the affected area, SQKM, which, while being of the expected 
negative sign in each estimation, is only significant, at conventional levels in the 269 unit and 259 
unit sub-samples.  However, it should be pointed out that while not significant at conventionally 
accepted levels, in the 264 unit sub-sample, SQKM’s t-value of 1.53 is clearly strong enough to 
indicate some degree of practical importance. 
The only control variable that behaves poorly in the estimations is the frequency with 
which quake’s strike a given region, FREQ.  It would be expected that in areas where quakes are 
relatively more common, comparatively less damage would be suffered simply as an outgrowth 
of a local population’s ‘learning by doing’.  We find only very weak evidence of this.   
Specifically, while FREQ is of the expected negative sign in the 264 and 259 unit sub-samples, it 
is consistently insignificant. 
 
7.  Further Empirical Considerations 
As is true with any empirical modeling, the results reported above are not without 
potential shortcomings that should be addressed.  The two of these that seem most likely to be 
problematic are the use of the land-based Gini as our primary measure of inequality and the lack 
of any empirical link between income/inequality and earthquake preparedness.  In this section, we 
offer evidence on each of these matters.  
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  First, while an income-based measure of inequality is somewhat more commonly 
employed in empirical work than a land-based measure, we provided above our arguments, 
actually those of Deininger and Squire (1998), as to why the land-based measure of inequality is 
superior in this application, so we will not repeat them here.  Rather, to address this issue, we re-
estimated the models reported in Table 3 replacing its measure of INEQUALITY with an income-
based Gini taken from Deininger and Squire (1998).  Other than this, the estimations are identical.  
Results of these estimations are reported in Table 4.  Again, as was true above, the choice of 
whether the estimator was random or fixed was based on a Hausman test and is noted in the table. 
____________________________Insert Table 4 About Here____________________________ 
As was true with the models of Table 3, the models using the alternate definition of 
INEQUALITY are quite strong, offering, in each case Wald Chi-Square values significant beyond 
the .01 level, indicating that the likelihood of the included independent variables being jointly 
equal to zero is virtually zero.  And, for the random-effects specifications, Chi-Square values for 
the likelihood ratio test of panel versus pooled estimators clearly show that, in each case, the 
panel estimator is preferred, beyond the .001 level.  Of greater importance, however, are the 
results for the key variables, GDPPC and INEQUALITY.  GDPPC shows the same very strong 
negative correlation with fatalities as when we used the land-based Gini.  The story is a bit less 
clear, however, for the income-based measure of INEQUALITY.  When this definition is used, 
while INEQUALITY exerts a consistently positive influence on fatalities, the coefficient is only 
significant, at conventional levels, in the 264 unit sub-sample.  Two points should be considered 
here.  First, while not significant at the standard, lower-bound .1 level in the 269 and 259 unit 
sub-samples, the coefficients on INEQUALITY are reasonably strong, being significant at the .16 
and .13 levels, respectively.  So, while not consistently significant, these outcomes do clearly 
suggest that there is a positive relation, though not as strong as we would like to find, between 
fatalities and INEQUALITY, when the alternate definition of the latter is used. 
Second, and perhaps of even more importance, it should be recalled that one of the  
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primary arguments in favor of the land-based measure of INEQUALITY is that it shows a rather 
lower correlation between INEQUALITY and GDPPC  than does the income-based measure.   
Given that our models, both theoretical and empirical, require each of these key variables to 
appear as independent variables in the regressions, using the income-based measure subjects the 
models to possible multi-colinearity, of at least some degree.  Of course, the expected outcome 
from multi-colinearity is inflated standard errors and the resultant fall in levels of significance. As 
evidence of this possibility, consider the simple correlations between GDPPC and the alternate 
definitions of INEQUALITY.  When the land-based measure of INEQUALITY  is used, the 
correlation with GDPPC is -0.14.   When we switch to the income-based definition of 
INEQUALITY, the correlation rises to -0.44. While we can not definitively conclude that such 
correlation is responsible for the rather weaker relation we find when the income-based measure 
of INEQUALITY is used, it is certainly consistent with such an outcome. 
Finally, with respect to the remaining variables in these models, it should be noted that 
the alternate definitions of INEQUALITY do not lead to pronounced differences in outcomes.  
That is, both the preferred land-based and income-based measures of INEQUALITY provide 
evidence of a positive relation between INEQUALITY and fatalities and do so without introducing 
any noticeable instability in the models. 
The second issue that deserves attention concerns a key part of the theoretical model 
which can only be inferred in the empirical model, namely, the correlation between 
GDDPC/INEQUALITY and earthquake preparedness.  The primary argument of the theoretical 
model is that income and equality work together to determine a country’s level of collective 
action, in the form of earthquake preparedness.  Ideally, we would like to have data on 
preparedness, by country, over the entire time period to show this point.  Unfortunately, such data 
do not exist. 
As a second-best solution, however, we have identified three indices of preparedness, by 
country, each of which is available for one year in the middle-1990s.  The first is, Regulations for  
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Seismic Design, RSD, which is taken from the International Association for Earthquake 
Engineering’s (1996) Regulations for Seismic Design: A World List-1996.  RSD is based on a 
country’s compliance with earthquake design codes and regulations and takes into account such 
factors as seismic design criteria, zones and loads.  RSD is available for each of the 26 countries 
in our sample.  Each country is assigned a value of zero (failing to satisfy the criteria) or one 
(compliance). 
The second index of earthquake preparedness is taken from Paz’s (1995) International 
Handbook of Earthquake Engineering, IHEE, and, while similar to RSD in that it considers a 
country’s compliance with earthquake design codes, it is a bit more restrictive in that it also takes 
into account a country’s main recent developments in seismic code activity.  IHEE is also 
available for each of the countries in our sample and is coded as is RSD. 
Our third index of collective action in terms of quake preparedness, Earthquake Disaster 
Preparedness Index, EDPI, is from the World Seismic Safety Initiative (WSSI) (available at 
http://www.wssi.org/).  EDPI offers a rather unique look at preparedness in that it reflects the 
subjective opinions of those involved with the International Association of Earthquake 
Engineering’s WSSI.  That is, expert seismologists representing each of 18 countries provided 
their subjective opinions as to their own county’s level of preparedness, after having participated 
in the WSSI’s 1999 Bangkok workshop.  This index ranges from 0 (effectively no preparation) to 
10 (maximal preparation) and is available for 10 countries in our sample.  Descriptive statistics 
and correlation information for these indices are presented in Table 5. 
____________________________Insert Table 5 About Here_____________________________   
Given the limited nature of these three indices of collective action, the primary evidence 
we can take from them reflects the simple correlations between them and the key variables, 
GDPPC and INEQUALITY (using values from the middle-1900s for each, so as to be consistent 
with the preparedness measures).  In each case, though admittedly limited in scope, the 
correlations do show the link between GDPPC/INEQUALITY and preparedness that can only be  
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implied by our empirical models.  That is, the correlations between GDPPC and RSD, IHEE and 
EDPI are, as expected, each positive and rather strong, ranging from 0.39 to 0.81.  Conversely, 
the correlations between INEQUALITY and RSD, IHEE and EDPI are, also as expected, negative 
and reasonably robust, ranging from -0.32 to -0.43.  In an attempt to determine the strength of 
these relations, Table 6 provides difference in means tests for each of these indices, relative to 
GDPPC and INEQUALITY (the EDPI index is divided at its median to allow for the test and is 
labeled EDPIX, while RSD and IHEE are already coded zero-one, as noted above). 
____________________________Insert Table 6 About Here____________________________ 
Given the coding of each, those with a value of zero can be thought of as reflecting the 
countries in the sample that have invested relatively little in earthquake preparedness while those 
with a value of one have invested relatively more.  While these tests are on rather small samples, 
it is clear from them that GDPPC and INEQUALITY are strongly correlated with earthquake 
preparedness.  Specifically, Table 6 indicates that earthquake preparedness is significantly greater 
in countries that have higher levels of GDPPC and lower levels of INEQUALITY.  And the 
differences, in addition to being statistically significant in every case, are rather dramatic from a 
practical perspective: being in the relatively quake-prepared portion of the sample is associated 
with a mean difference in GDPPC of just over $10,000 relative to those countries that are 
relatively unprepared while the mean difference in INEQUALITY  between the two groups 
amounts to a bit more than seven Gini points, on average. 
Finally, in an attempt to offer some multivariate evidence regarding the link between 
earthquake preparedness and income and inequality, we estimated a simple probit model using 
the relatively restrictive preparedness index, IHEE, as the dependent variable and including 
GDPPC and INEQUALITY, along with a constant, as independent variables.  Consistent with the 
univariate presented above, this model not only shows a good fit with a pseudo R-Square of 0.53, 
but also yields coefficients on GDPPC and INEQUALITY that are both significant, beyond the .05  
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level, and of the expected positive and negative signs, respectively.
25 
While, obviously, a complete time series of preparedness would provide more persuasive 
evidence, these indices and the resulting empirics, at a minimum, are strongly suggestive of our 
contention that per capita income and equality are strong determinants of collective action, as it 
relates to earthquake preparedness.  This is especially true given that the three indices of 
collective action are methodologically different from one another and are produced by different 
organizations of seismic experts.  Given the continuing work of organizations like MCEER, the 
International Association of Earthquake Engineering and WSSI, in time, sets of complete time 
series for these and other preparedness measures allowing for more thorough analysis of the 
question will be available.  As for now, however, inference from such admittedly simple empirics 
is the best evidence available. 
 
8. Conclusion 
  Earthquakes and other natural disasters claim tens of thousands of lives worldwide each 
year, not to mention the accompanying billions of dollars in property damage.  Too often there is 
a tendency to ascribe such events to uncontrollable “acts of nature,” releasing humankind of any 
role in the tragedies.  In this paper, we develop and test a theoretical model that suggests that, in 
fact, political-economic institutions are at least partly responsible for earthquake fatalities.  That 
is, we develop a theoretical model which shows that collective action in the form of creation and 
enforcement of building codes, appropriate professional licensing, earthquake-sensitive zoning 
and, if needed, retrofitting of structures can significantly reduce the devastation of major 
earthquakes.  More importantly, this model shows that the probability of collective action is an 
                                                 
25 There are two obvious shortcomings of this model that limit our ability to offer more complete multivariate evidence.  
First is its rather limited sample size of just 26 countries.  Equally important, however, both given a lack of available 
data to estimate a complete model of preparedness and the degrees of freedom necessary to estimate such a model, 
were the data available; we offer these results only to provide the reader with a sense that the univariate analysis 
presented in Table 6 likely is, at least to some extent, supportable in a multivariate framework, should the necessary 
data exist.  These results are available from the corresponding author, upon request.  
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increasing function of a country’s per capita level of income and degree of equality.  We test 
these predictions by considering, in a Random/Fixed Effects Negative Binomial framework, 269 
major earthquakes occurring worldwide between 1960 and 2002.  The results strongly support the 
predictions of the theoretical model.  Thus, policies designed to improve per capita income and 
reduce inequality can be expected to, through their impact on the likelihood of collective action, 
mitigate the effects of major quakes.  Of course, such policies are easier recommended than 
developed and implemented.  And, unfortunately, improvements in these areas, in and of 
themselves, cannot be expected to fully alleviate the devastation done by severe quakes.  Yet, it is 
our hope that this analysis provides yet one more reason to work toward policies that serve to 
increase per capita income and equality, especially in the developing world, where natural 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  St.  Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FATALITIES  884.04 4,897.14 0.00 50,000.00 
MAGNITUDE  6.81 0.61 6.00 8.50 
FREQUENCY  0.47 0.28 0.01 1.15 
DISTANCE  133.81 135.67 5.94 811.61 
POPULATION  8,952.56 20,513.37 1.98 166,052.79 
SQUARE KM’s  189,048.46 341,145.53 154.00 1,522,595.02 
GDPPC  7,672.67 11,025.96 101.58 44,774.71 




Table 2. Relation between Fatalities and GDPPC and INEQUALITY 


















Fatalities  1,151.62 5,230.36 622.37 4,551.95       529.25 
(0.88)
Magnitude  6.82 0.58 6.81 0.63           0.01 
(0.12)
 












Fatalities  1280.25 6537.21 478.90 2158.03             801.35 
              (1.36) 
Magnitude 
6.78 0.61 6.84 0.61               -0.06 
   (-0.88) 
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Table 3.  Regressions on Earthquake Fatalities  
Variables         (1)         (2)              (3) 
Intercept  -10.66** 
           (2.697) 
-12.68** 
        (  2.886) 
-12.26** 





          (0.087) 
 
-0.27** 
          (0.087) 
 
-0.27** 




  3.03** 
          (0.968) 
 
2.46** 
           (0.966) 
 
  2.97** 




            0.14** 
          (0.055) 
 
            0.11** 
           (0.056) 
 
                 0.15** 




         -0.09* 
          (0.046) 
 
        -0.07 
           (0.046) 
 
               -0.83* 




         0.02 
          (0.039) 
 
          -0.03 
           (0.041) 
 
            -0.24 





          (0.068) 
 
-0.37** 
           (0.066) 
 
-0.40** 





          (0.443) 
 
2.42** 
           (0.486) 
 
2.15** 





           
 
          
            
 
               
                
 
ESTIMATOR       RANDOM     RANDOM
            
 
           FIXED     
                
 
Wald  Chi-Square 
 




      47.28** 
Number of 
Observations           269          264               259 
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Table 4.  Regressions on Earthquake Fatalities (Alternate Measure of 
Inequality) 
Variables         (1)         (2)              (3) 
Intercept  -5.55** 
           (2.521) 
- 5.50** 
        ( 2.570) 
- 5.28** 





          (0.087) 
 
-0.20** 
          (0.090) 
 
-0.21** 





          (0.952) 
 
1.50* 
           (0.947) 
 
  2.13** 




            0.09* 
          (0.053) 
 
         0.05 
           (0.054) 
 
                 0.09* 




       -0.06 
          (0.046) 
 
        -0.23 
           (0.047) 
 
             -0.04 




        0.04 
          (0.038) 
 
          0.14  
           (0.037) 
 
             0.02   





          (0.060) 
 
-0.22** 
           (0.060) 
 
-0.28** 




          0.56   
          (0.405) 
 
0.88** 
           (0.416) 
 
                  0.63   





           
 
          
            
 
               
                
 
ESTIMATOR       RANDOM  FIXED
            
 
               FIXED   




   32.15**
 
   25.65**
 
   31.84** 
Number of 
Observations           269          264               259 
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   Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Preparedness Indices 
 





Mean St. Deviation 
 
 Minimum  Maximum 
RSD       0.61      0.49 0.00      1.00
IHEE    0.54   0.51 0.00    1.00
EPDI    3.70  1.76  0.00  8.00
 








RSD  0.39 -0.39  
IHEE  0.48 -0.43  
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Table 6. Relations between GDPPC, INEQUALITY and Preparedness 
 
Panel 2a. GDPPC, INEQUALITY and RSD 
 
Variable RSD=0 









GDPPC  1,112.29 1,096.48 9,387.64 12,179.18  -8,275.34** 
          (2.13) 
 
INEQUALITY     45.34      10.55    38.39      6.44         6.94** 
        (2.09) 
 
      
 












GDPPC  962.36 962.56 10,698.35 12,510.16  -9,735.99** 
        (2.68) 
 
INEQUALITY          45.02       9.43  37.68     6.75             7.34** 
        (2.31) 
 
      
 
Panel 2c. GDPPC, INEQUALITY and EDPIX 
 
Variable       EDPIX=0 
         Mean 
     EDPIX=0 
      Std. Dev. 
      EDPIX=1  
Mean                
      EDPIX=1 
       Std. Dev. 
Difference
     t-test
GDPPC  1,130.25      974.20 18,248.00 17,921.46  -17,117.75* 
         (2.13) 
INEQUALITY  40.25    5.89 32.86  3.86      7.39** 
          (2.34) 
Notes: t-statistics for differences in means are in parentheses; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and 
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Appendix 1. Description of Primary Data and Sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Distance  Distance between the epicenter and the 
affected geographic region measured by 
the square root of the sum of the squares 
of the depth and surface-distance. 
Latitude, longitude and depth 
of epicenter: NGDC 
Significant Earthquake 
Database. 
Latitude and longitude of 
affected region: Getty 
Theasurus of Geographic 
Names on Line 
(www.getty.edu). 
 
Fatalities  Number of casualties due to an 
earthquake. 
NGDC Significant Earthquake 
Database 
 
Frequency  Ratio of the number of 6+ Ritcher scale 
earthquakes occurring within a country 
during the period 1900-1959 to 60. 




GDP per capita  Real GDP per capita, expressed in 
constant (1995) U.S. dollars. 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators 2002 
  
Inequality  Country’s initial distribution of the 
operational holdings of agricultural land, 
ranging from 0-100, in percentage terms. 




Magnitude  Magnitude of an earthquake determined 
from the logarithm of the amplitude of 
waves recorded by seismographs; 
measured in Ritcher Scale. 





Population  Population of the province(s) affected, 
expressed in “thousands”. 
The World Gazetteer 
(www.world-gazetteer.com), 




Square Kilometers  Land area of the province(s) affected, 
expressed in “square kilometers”. 
The World Gazetteer 
(www.world-gazetteer.com), 
GeoHive (www.xist.org). 
 
 
 
 